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Lawfare 101
A Primer
Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force, Retired
For many commanders and other military leaders, the role of law in twenty-first century conflicts is a source of frustration. Some think it 
is “handcuffing” them in a way that is inhibiting combat 
success.1 For others, law is another “tool that is used 
by the enemies of the West.”2 For at least one key ally, 
Great Britain, law seems to be injecting counterpro-
ductive hesitancy into operational environments.3 All 
of these interpretations have elements of truth, but at 
the same time they are not quite accurate in providing 
Sgt. Kyle Hale of 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, contains an unruly crowd 10 June 2008 
to protect a man who was nearly trampled outside the Al Rasheed Bank in the Jamila market in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq. 
(Photo by Petros Giannakouris, Associated Press)
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LAWFARE
an understanding of what might be called the role of 
lawfare in today’s military conflicts.
Law has become central to twenty-first century con-
flicts. Today’s wars are waged in what Joel Trachtman 
calls a “law-rich environment, with an abundance of 
legal rules and legal fora.”4 This is the result of many 
factors outside of the military context, including the 
impact of internationalized economics. Still, as the 
Global Policy Forum points out, globalization “is 
changing the contours of law and creating new global 
legal institutions and norms.”5
As with many other aspects of modern life, trends 
in the economic sphere impact warfighting, and this in-
cludes how law interacts with armed conflict. Many se-
nior leaders have come to recognize this reality. Retired 
Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO 
commander and U.S. national security advisor, observed 
several years ago that the nature of war had changed. “It’s 
become very legalistic and very complex,” he said, adding 
that now “you have to have a lawyer or a dozen.”6
Technology has also revolutionized the impact of 
law on war, as its many manifestations add to war’s 
complexity. Sorting out the implications of technolo-
gy for warfighting requires an advanced appreciation 
for the norms that do—or should—govern it. Retired 
Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently observed that 
“technology has only made law more relevant to the 
battlefield.”7 He believes that “no true understanding 
of the exercise of U.S. military power can be attained 
without a solid appreciation of how the law shapes 
military missions and their outcomes.”8
The purpose of this article is to provide an over-
view of the concept of what has come to be known as 
lawfare. This essay also aims to provide some practical 
context for nonlawyer leaders to think about lawfare, 
as well as some considerations for how to prepare to 
operate against an enemy seeking to capitalize on this 
phenomenon of contemporary conflicts.9
What is Lawfare?
The term lawfare has existed for some time, but 
its modern usage first appeared in a paper this au-
thor wrote for Harvard’s Kennedy School in 2001.10 
Lawfare represents an effort to provide military and 
other nonlawyer audiences an easily understood 
“bumper sticker” phrasing for how belligerents, and 
particularly those unable to challenge America’s 
high-tech military capabilities, are attempting to use 
law as a form of “asymmetric” warfare.11
Over time, the definition has evolved, but today it 
is best understood as the use of law as a means of ac-
complishing what might otherwise require the appli-
cation of traditional military force. It is something of 
an example of what Chinese strategist Sun Tzu might 
say is the “supreme excellence” of war, which aims to 
subdue “the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”12 
Most often, however, it will only be one part of a 
larger strategy that could likely involve kinetic (lethal) 
and other traditional military capabilities.
More importantly, lawfare is ideologically neutral. 
Indeed, it is helpful to think of it as a weapon that can be 
used for good or evil, depending upon who is wielding 
it and for what reasons. As Trachtman says, “Lawfare 
can substitute for warfare where it provides a means to 
compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic 
warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be 
ineffective.”13 That is a truth that is equally applicable to 
America’s enemies as it is to the United States itself.
How Has the United States 
Used Lawfare?
There are many ex-
amples of how law can 
be used to peacefully 
substitute for other 
military methodol-
ogies. For example, 
during the early part 
of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, commercial 
satellite imagery of 
areas in Afghanistan 
became available on 
the open market. 
Although there may 
have been a number 
of ways to stop such 
extremely valuable 
data from falling into 
hostile hands, a legal 
“weapon”—a con-
tract—was used to 
buy up the imagery. 
Doing so prevented 
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“the pictures from falling into the hands of terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda.”14
Law plays a very significant role in counterinsur-
gency operations. Although the term lawfare is not 
used, Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering 
Insurgencies, is replete with how law is a key element of 
the comprehensive approach that success in such con-
flicts requires.15 In particular, it makes the point that 
“establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state 
in counterinsurgency.”16 As Gen. David H. Petraeus 
has pointed out, it is unlikely that a counterinsurgency 
effort will succeed absent a form of lawfare that brings 
about the rule of law in the target state instead of rely-
ing solely on killing or capturing the insurgent force.17
There are further legal means that can impact 
military capabilities rather directly. For example, 
sanctions crippled the Iraqi air force to the point 
where fewer than one-third of its aircraft were flyable 
when the coalition invaded in 2003.18 The operational 
impact is obvious: Iraqi jets were grounded just as 
effectively as if they were shot down. Sanctions are 
also seen as having slowed Russia’s military buildup. 
Kyle Mizokami reported in 2016 that international 
sanctions (along with falling oil prices) were adverse-
ly affecting the economy, which, in turn, frustrated 
Russia’s efforts to rebuild its military.19
There has been an array of approaches for using law 
to undermine adversaries, approaches that can be put 
under the aegis of lawfare. For example, Juan Zarate, a 
former Treasury Department official, describes a range 
of legal initiatives his agency used to disrupt and deny 
terrorists, in particular the financial resources they 
needed.20 In addition, even private litigation is working 
to deny access to the banking and social media plat-
forms terrorists increasingly rely upon.21
How Does the Adversary 
Use Lawfare?
Many hostile nonstate actors use lawfare as a 
mainstay of their strategy for confronting high-tech 
militaries. To be clear, they are using the law in order 
to turn respect for the law in the United States and 
other democratic countries into a vulnerability. For 
example, they might seek to exploit real or imagined 
reports of civilian casualties in the hopes that fear of 
causing more of the same will result in a constrained 
use of certain military technologies (e.g., airpower) by 
rule-of-law countries like the United States.
The after effects of the bombing of the Al Firdos 
bunker during the 1991 Gulf War presaged much of 
what we see today. Although believed to be a military 
command-and-control center, it was actually being 
used as a shelter for the families of high-level Iraqi offi-
cials. When pictures of dead and injured civilians were 
broadcast worldwide, they “accomplished what the 
Iraqi air defenses could not: downtown Baghdad was to 
be attacked sparingly, if at all.”22
Ironically, nothing violative of the law of war had 
occurred, but perceptions of the same had the oper-
ational effect of a sophisticated air defense system.23 
Many adversaries have “gone to school” on this event as 
an example of a low-tech means to counter high-tech 
systems. Obviously, perceptions do matter. Michael 
Riesman and Chris T. Antoniou insist,
In modern popular democracies, even a 
limited armed conflict requires a substan-
tial base of public support. That support 
can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no 
matter how worthy the political objective, 
if people believe that the war is being con-
ducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniqui-
tous way. [italics added]24
Accordingly, after witnessing what the Al Firdos 
bombing raid accomplished, some adversaries seek 
to exploit such incidents when they occur, but others 
seek to orchestrate them in order to get the bene-
fit of the restraint that might follow. For example, 
the Islamic State “uses civilians as human shields to 
claim that the U.S.-led coalition is targeting innocent 
people during the strikes.”25
They are using the law in order to turn respect for the 
law in the United States and other democratic countries 
into a vulnerability.
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In fact, most U.S. adversaries actually see our polit-
ical culture’s respect for the law as a “center of gravity” 
to be exploited. William Eckhardt observes,
Knowing that our society so respects the 
rule of law that it demands compliance with 
it, our enemies carefully attack our military 
plans as illegal and immoral and our execu-
tion of those plans as contrary to the law of 
war. Our vulnerability here is what philoso-
pher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term 
our “center of gravity.”26
Incidents of illegality markedly advance an enemy’s 
lawfare strategy. The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal 
that occurred during the Iraq War is a classic illustra-
tion.27 It is significant that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, 
then commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 
(commander of coalition ground forces in Iraq), used 
traditional military language in assessing the impact of 
the explosion of criminality at Abu Ghraib by terming it 
“clearly a defeat” because its effect was indistinguishable 
from that imposed by traditional military setbacks.28 
Elsewhere, as reported by Joseph Berger in the New York 
Times, Petraeus, then head of U.S. Central Command, 
had explained during an interview how violations of the 
law impact what happens on the battlefield:
“Whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedi-
ent measures, they have turned around and 
bitten us in the backside,” [Petraeus] said. 
Whenever Americans have used methods 
that violated the Geneva Conventions or the 
standards of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, he said: “We end up paying the 
price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other 
situations like that are nonbiodegradable. 
They don’t go away. The enemy continues to 
beat you with them like a stick.”29
The situation is even more aggravated in an era of 
proliferated sports cameras, cell phones, and similar 
Syrian Army officers and their families who support President Bashar 
al-Assad are locked in “human shield” cages by a rebel group called 
“Army of Islam” 31 October 2015 in the Damascus suburb of Douma, 
Syria. The group claimed the human shields would protect Douma’s 
civilians from airstrikes led by Russian and Syrian air forces. (Photo by 
Balkis Press/Sipa USA via Associated Press) 
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devices able to record and transmit images worldwide in 
real or near-real time. A forty-second video of marines 
urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban that went “viral” 
was, according Afghan leaders, a “recruitment tool for 
the Taliban.”30 This is exactly the kind of avoidable illegal-
ity that lawfare-oriented adversaries readily exploit.
The point is that today each troop in the field is, 
indeed, a “strategic corporal.” Gen. Charles C. Krulak, 
former commandant of the Marine Corps, said in 1999 
that “the individual marine will be the most conspicu-
ous symbol of American foreign policy and will poten-
tially influence not only the immediate tactical situa-
tion, but the operational and strategic levels as well.”31 
Today, the exposure of lawfulness or unlawfulness of 
individuals, superempowered by technology, is able to 
have an operational or strategic impact.
Chinese and Russian Lawfare
It is a mistake to think that lawfare is something 
only utilized by technology-vulnerable nonstate ac-
tors. Countries with formidable military capabilities 
do employ lawfare, but differently. China, for example, 
has an extremely sophisticated “legal warfare” doctrine, 
which designates such strategies as one of their “three 
warfares.”32 According to Dean Cheng, the “People’s 
Liberation Army are approaching lawfare from a differ-
ent perspective: as an offensive weapon capable of ham-
stringing opponents and seizing the political initiative.”33
Quoting Chinese sources, Cheng says, “Legal 
warfare, at its most basic, involves ‘arguing that one’s 
own side is obeying the law, criticizing the other side 
for violating the law, and making arguments for one’s 
own side in cases where there are also violations of 
the law.’”34 Current events suggest that China seems 
to be executing its lawfare strategy. Indeed, some 
observers see this strategy as the main thrust of their 
expansion into the South China Sea.35
Additionally, today, Russia is often viewed as a pre-
eminent practitioner of what has been called “hybrid 
war,” of which lawfare is an element. In Army par-
lance, the term “hybrid threat” captures “the seeming-
ly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity 
of actors involved, and the blurring between tradi-
tional elements of conflict.”36 It combines “traditional 
forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom 
with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions 
on violence or target selection.”37
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph 
F. Dunford Jr. says he tries to stay away from “hybrid” 
terminology. Rather, he considers it “a competition 
with an adversary that has a military dimension, but 
the adversary knows exactly what the threshold is 
for us to take decisive military action.” Consequently, 
he says “they operate below that level,” and are able 
to “continue to advance their interests and we lose 
competitive advantage.”38
Legal experts say that Russia’s form of hybrid 
warfare explicitly seeks to blur legal lines in order to 
exploit the uncertainty that results.39 They posit that the 
“inherent complexity, ambiguity, and the attributable 
character of hybrid warfare create not only new security 
but also legal challenges,” especially for these “who adhere 
to international law within good faith and the commonly 
agreed frameworks established under and governed by 
the principles of the rule of law.”40 Plainly, this is a form of 
lawfare and something long a part of Russia’s arsenal.41
Responding at the Tactical Level: 
The Commander’s Responsibilities
Quite obviously, many of the challenges and oppor-
tunities presented by lawfare in its many manifes-
tations arise mostly at the strategic and operational 
levels of conflict. This does not, however, mean that 
other aspects of lawfare are of no importance to those 
at the tactical level. This is relevant with respect to 
denying the enemy the opportunity to employ lawfare 
techniques to exploit or orchestrate acts that create 
the fact or perception of lawlessness that will under-
mine or even prevent mission success.
Most commanders and tactical-level leaders 
understand that they have a wide variety of respon-
sibilities in the legal arena, particularly with respect 
to discipline. The Army’s 2015 Commander’s Legal 
Handbook counsels that in many instances,
The purpose of your actions should be to pre-
serve the legal situation until you can consult 
with your servicing Judge Advocate. However, 
like most aspects of your command responsi-
bilities, you can fail if you just wait for things 
to come to you. You need to be proactive in 
preventing problems before they occur.42
In terms of operations, being proactive with respect 
to the challenge of lawfare includes what I call “legal 
preparation of the battlespace.”
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Legal Preparation of 
the Battlespace
Commanders are familiar with the concept of 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield but need to 
add legal preparation of the battlespace to their “to-
do” list.43 This means systematically analyzing the le-
gal dimensions of a particular mission and its context, 
and determining their potential effect on operations. 
It then becomes incumbent on commanders—at 
every level—to take whatever actions they can to en-
hance positive effects of the law on the operation, and 
to eliminate or mitigate potential adverse impacts.
Key to this effort would be utilization of 
the supporting judge advocate generals ( JAGs). 
Like other services, the Army JAG Corps has 
established an explicit practice area to “provide 
legal advice to commanders and their staffers on 
domestic, foreign, and international laws that 
influence military operations.”44
Recently, Maj. Dan Maurer, an Army JAG, ad-
vised his fellow uniformed lawyers about the need to 
understand their advisory role vis-à-vis the com-
mander and other decision makers. Although not 
addressing lawfare specifically, his advice nevertheless 
has application: “Decision-makers need to be fully 
confident and fully aware of not only what you think, 
but why you think it, and how their particular deci-
sions will affect others beyond the slim consequences 
of the immediate battle drill.”45
Most commanders would likely agree with 
Maurer, but how can they ensure that their legal advi-
sor is capable of giving them that sort of insight? Part 
of the answer is easy, in that commanders will likely 
be supported by a JAG with strong legal skills. Getting 
an appointment as a JAG officer is extremely compet-
itive these days, and law students and lawyers who as-
pire for a commission must be among the very best.46 
However, legal acumen is only part of the process.
The finest lawyer cannot be effective if he or she 
does not fully understand the client’s business and 
needs. In the military setting, this means a deep un-
derstanding of the mission, capabilities, and mindset 
of the supported unit. Much of this falls upon the 
JAG to develop, but commanders can facilitate the 
process by reaching out to their supporting legal offi-
cer. This means ensuring that the JAG visits the unit 
frequently and acquires a familiarity with its soldiers, 
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equipment, and methods of operation. This must be 
accomplished in garrison because it is extremely difficult 
to do on the fly or once deployed.
Success, Maurer tells us, is “measured by the rela-
tionship itself between the advisor and principal decision 
maker.”47 He offers these questions for introspection by 
both the legal advisor and the decision maker:
Is [the relationship] characterized by trust? 
Is it deep? Is it candid? Does it forgive 
errors and accept nuance and a bit of cha-
os? Is it built to allow for the time to be all 
of these things, or is it nothing more than a 
twice-monthly status report?48
None of this, of course, obviates the responsibility 
of the supporting legal advisor and others in his or her 
functional chain of supervision to engage in a wide-rang-
ing professional, and often highly technical, legal analysis, 
and to prepare a supporting legal plan that spans all 
levels of war as is necessary to effectively wage lawfare 
and, conversely, defend against it.49
Educate the Troops about Lawfare
Beyond securing the right legal advisor, it is im-
portant to have the troops understand the “why” about 
lawfare. The most obvious part of this process for tac-
tical-level units is ensuring the troops understand that 
battlespace discipline is more than a matter of personal 
character and accountability; it directly relates, as dis-
cussed earlier, to operational success.
Consequently, commanders and other leaders 
need to explain the importance of denying adver-
saries incidents of real or perceived misconduct that 
can be exploited. This part of the legal preparation 
of the battlefield must begin long before the unit ar-
rives in the battlespace. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained in Chappell v. Wallace,
The inescapable demands of military dis-
cipline and obedience to orders cannot be 
taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate 
compliance with military procedures and 
orders must be virtually reflex, with no time 
for debate or reflection.50
Yet at the same time, twenty-first century com-
manders need to appreciate that today’s troops are 
not automatons (and we should not want them to be). 
According to the 2016 Deloitte Millennial Survey, per-
sonal values have the greatest influence on millennials’ 
decision making.51 This means they need to have a keen 
understanding of how a task fits with their personal val-
ues or ethics.52 Richard Schragger points out that “law 
allows our troops to engage in forceful, violent acts with 
relatively little hesitation or moral qualms.”53 Law can, 
he says, create a “well-defined legal space within which 
individual soldiers can act without resorting to their 
own personal moral codes.”54
Absent a firm grounding in the importance of law 
and its moral underpinnings, personal moral codes 
can take a dark turn under the enormous stress of 
combat. The late historian Stephen Ambrose observed 
that it is a “universal aspect of war” that when you put 
young troops “in a foreign country with weapons in 
their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you 
wish had never happened.”55 More recently, William 
Langewiesche has reported on just how combat can 
catastrophically distort the judgment of otherwise good 
soldiers.56 This and other case studies need to be care-
fully examined by leaders, JAGs, and troops alike.
Clearly, to deny adversaries an effective lawfare 
strategy, troops must be trained on the law of war and 
its incorporation into the rules of engagement. Leaders, 
however, need to be wary of self-imposed restraints, 
because they can work to benefit adversaries. For exam-
ple, the announcement by NATO first and later by the 
United States of the rules of engagement that require 
a “near certainty” of zero civilian casualties creates the 
perception of illegality when such casualties inevitably 
occur, even though international law does not require 
zero civilian casualties but merely that they need not 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and directed 
military advantage anticipated.57
Such publicly announced restraints invite adversar-
ies to do exactly what the law does not want them to do: 
embed themselves among civilians in order to protect 
themselves from an air attack more effectively than any 
air defense might be able to do. Indeed, there is a real 
risk that overly restrictive rules of engagement may, par-
adoxically, endanger civilians because the failure to con-
duct a strike may save some civilians in the near term, 
but over time, the enemy who escapes an attack may go 
on to wreak more havoc on innocents, which would not 
have been the case if the attack had gone forward and 
the enemy had been neutralized.58
All of this suggests that the complexities of mod-
ern battlefields, and in particular the implications of 
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lawfare and counter-lawfare techniques, make solu-
tions very fact-dependent. A sophisticated understand-
ing of the legal “terrain” is essential and will require a 
real intellectual investment by military leaders and 
their forces if they are to be prepared to succeed.
The legal machinations of Russians waging hybrid 
war are not necessarily the same as China’s legal warfare 
in the South China Sea or the Islamic State’s ruthless ex-
ploitation of human shields to ward off high-tech weap-
onry. Each approach is a related but differing application 
of lawfare. Only by a discriminate and detailed analysis 
of these various lawfare strategies will U.S. forces be able 
to anticipate and blunt an adversary’s use of lawfare.
Concluding Observations
There is yet much work to do. In his book on 
lawfare, Orde Kittrie makes the astute observation 
that “despite the term having been coined by a U.S. 
government official, the U.S. government has only 
sporadically engaged with the concept of lawfare.”59 
He goes on to lament that the United States has “no 
lawfare strategy or doctrine, and no office or inter-
agency mechanism that systematically develops or 
coordinates U.S. offensive lawfare or U.S. defenses 
against lawfare.”60
Although enumerating all of the techniques to 
counter adversary lawfare strategies is beyond the scope 
of this article, I hope that, together with other experts, 
a start is underway. Fortunately, some useful work 
has been done with respect to specific challenges. For 
example, Stefan Halper’s 2013 paper—prepared for the 
Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessments—
provides useful ideas not only for the specific situation it 
addresses (China’s actions in the South China Sea) but 
also with real application to other lawfare situations.61 
Trachtman has also done some valuable work that will 
help develop thinking about lawfare.62
Furthermore, in a recent article in NATO’s Three 
Swords Magazine, U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Moore 
notes that while the alliance has no formal definition 
or doctrine, the concept has been discussed in pa-
pers and at conferences.63 Given the rise especially of 
Russia’s employment of hybrid war with its lawfare 
element, he believes it is urgent that NATO coalesce 
its already extant thinking about lawfareand express it 
in a formal doctrine in order to facilitate the alliance’s 
ability to defend itself against lawfare techniques, as 
well as to use the concept proactively.64
In the meantime, commanders and leaders at 
all levels need to include law and lawfare into their 
planning process and operational conduct, even in the 
absence of formal doctrine. The fact is that lawfare is 
not a passing phenomenon; it is intrinsic to current 
conflicts and will continue to be so for the foreseeable 
future. The best leaders will ensure that they and their 
troops will be prepared to meet this challenge.
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